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Introduction
The  tax-driven  expatriation  of  US 
corporations is a troubling phenomenon. 
In a “corporate inversion,” a new foreign 
corporation, typically located in a low-tax 
or  no-tax  country,  replaces  the  existing 
US parent corporation of a multinational 
enterprise (MNE). The US corporation then 
becomes a subsidiary of the new foreign 
parent. Since the US tax treatment of an 
MNE operating in the United States is sig-
nificantly less favorable when the top-tier 
parent  corporation  is  a  domestic  rather 
than a foreign corporation, the inversion 
transaction averts a substantial amount of 
US tax.1 Inversions have attracted adverse 
attention from tax specialists, media, the 
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US  Treasury  Department,  and  Congress. 
In  the  wake  of  September  11,  it  seemed 
downright  unpatriotic  for  US  firms  to 
invert as a way of skimping on their tax 
payments.
In June 2002, Congressman Bill Thom-
as  (R-CA),  chairman  of  the  House  Ways 
and Means Committee, with the support of 
the Treasury Department, proposed com-
prehensive  international  tax  legislation 
designed,  among  other  things,  to  thwart 
corporate  inversions.  A  key  component 
of Thomas’s solution was to significantly 
tighten the “earnings stripping” rules un-
der Section 163(j) of the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC). The Bush administration in-
cluded a similar proposal in its fiscal 2004 
budget, released in February 2003.
To  understand  the  debate  surround-
ing the earnings stripping rules, we first 
review  the  tax  motivation  for  corporate 
inversions and the fundamental tensions 
inherent  in  the  “classic”  US  tax  system 
Corporate inversions have attracted 
adverse attention from tax 
specialists, media, the US Treasury 
Department, and Congress. In the 
wake of September 11, it seemed 
downright unpatriotic for US firms 
to invert as a way of skimping on 
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(separate taxation of corporations and individuals). 
We then turn to earnings stripping, starting with 
the 2002 Preliminary Report on Tax Policy Implica-
tions of Corporate Inversion Transactions (hereafter 
Treasury Report 2002). Earnings stripping is said 
to occur when a US subsidiary pays an excessive 
amount of interest to a related foreign corporation.
Corporate Inversion Transactions
As an academic possibility, corporate inversions 
were analyzed as early as the mid-1970s (Kramer 
and Hufbauer 1975), but actual transactions were 
relatively  rare  until  the  mid-1990s.  The  last  few 
years have seen a marked increase in their frequen-
cy, size, and profile (Treasury Report 2002).
Basic Structure. Inversion transactions can be 
accomplished in various forms, with no real change 
in the operational activities of the corporate group. 
In the most common form, known as “stock inver-
sion,” the shareholders of a US parent corporation 
exchange their shares for those of a newly formed 
foreign  corporation  incorporated  in  a  tax  haven 
jurisdiction  such  as  Bermuda.  The  tax  haven  ju-
risdiction does not have an income tax treaty with 
the United States. Then the foreign parent corpora-
tion sets up a foreign subsidiary in a third country 
that does have an income tax treaty with the United 
States,  typically  Barbados  or  Luxembourg  (the 
treaty jurisdiction). The income tax treaty usually 
eliminates withholding tax on the payment of royal-
ties or interest from the United States to the treaty 
jurisdiction. Interest and royalties paid by the erst-
while US parent corporation (now a US subsidiary) 
to the treaty jurisdiction subsidiary, and then on 
to the new foreign parent, are no longer subject to
US tax.2
Other forms of inversion involve asset inversion 
(i.e., the actual transfer of assets from a US corpo-
ration to a newly formed foreign corporation) and 
various combinations of asset inversion and stock 
inversion.
Tax Benefits. Inversions usually yield substan-
tial tax benefits for the inverted corporate group.3   
First,  corporate  inversion  may  shelter  US-source 
income  from  US  tax  by  diverting  taxable  income 
from the newly minted US subsidiary to the treaty 
jurisdiction subsidiary. The income tax treaty usu-
ally eliminates any withholding tax on the payment 
of royalties and interest from the United States to 
the treaty jurisdiction. Once the funds are paid out, 
they become a deductible expense to the US sub-
sidiary, and the receipts by the treaty jurisdiction 
subsidiary are no longer subject to US tax. There-
after, the money can be paid to the parent corpora-
tion located in the tax haven jurisdiction. This shifts 
interest or royalty payments from the US corporate 
pocket  to  a  related  foreign  corporate  pocket,  re-
sulting in an overall reduction of the US corporate
tax base.4
Second, corporate inversion may shelter foreign-
source income from US tax. The United States, un-
like most countries, taxes the worldwide income of 
its citizens and residents, including corporate resi-
dents. Thus a US-based MNE is subject to US tax on 
its foreign-source income, although double taxation 
is mitigated through the foreign tax credit system. 
By contrast, a foreign-based MNE is not subject to 
US tax on its foreign-source income.5 Thus, when 
a US-based MNE inverts and then reorganizes its 
foreign operations as subsidiaries of the new top-
tier  foreign  parent  corporation,  the  restructuring 
can  eliminate  the  application  of  US  international 
tax rules to the foreign operations of the MNE. If the 
new foreign parent is incorporated in a country that 
does not tax worldwide income (almost always the 
case), the third-country foreign operations are sub-
ject to tax only in the countries where they do busi-
ness. Moreover, the inverted MNE can now establish 
new foreign operations that are no longer subject to 
the anti-deferral regime of Subpart F.6
Fundamental Tensions
Before delving into the details of rules designed 
to curtail earnings stripping, it is worth reflecting 
on the fundamental tensions at play. In the “clas-
sic” US tax system—separate taxation of corpora-
tions and individuals—individual bondholders and 
shareholders are normally taxed on their interest 
and dividend receipts. However, corporate interest 
payments  are  a  deductible  expense,  but  dividend 
payments  are  not.  The  classic  structure  means 
that  dividends  are  taxed  twice—first  as  corporate 
earnings and then as shareholder income—whereas 
interest payments are taxed only once.7 This dis-
Earnings stripping is said to occur when an 
excessive portion of the corporate earnings 
of a US subsidiary is paid out as interest 
to the foreign parent corporation (or one 
of its foreign subsidiaries) and claimed as a 
deduction against the corporate income of 
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tinction  provides  a  tax  incentive  for  corporations 
to  finance  their  operations  with  debt  rather  than 
equity capital. 
For  obvious  tax  reasons,  the  Internal  Rev-
enue Service (IRS) prefers lower debt-equity ratios, 
whereas most corporations prefer higher debt-equi-
ty ratios. Prudential considerations keep the major-
ity of the corporations from going overboard on debt 
finance.  A  higher  debt-equity  ratio  means  lower 
credit rating, higher interest rates, and greater risk 
of bankruptcy. For closely held corporations (includ-
ing US subsidiaries), where shareholders and credi-
tors are aligned (for example, the parent corporation 
may be both shareholder and creditor), the pruden-
tial  disciplines  are  less  forceful.  These  situations 
give rise to troublesome cases under the classic US 
tax system, and the law gives no clear guidance as 
to when the legal form of a debt instrument should 
be ignored for tax purposes and instead re-charac-
terized as equity. In 1969, Congress enacted Section 
385, which gave the US Treasury authority to dis-
tinguish between debt and equity, looking behind 
the legal form of security instruments, but no regu-
lations have ever been promulgated. In the absence 
of a regulatory definition, in litigated cases courts 
have  examined  a  variety  of  factors  to  distinguish 
between debt and equity, taking into consideration 
all the facts and circumstances. The fundamental 
tension between debt and equity finance is thus re-
solved case by case.
 A second fundamental tension arises in the in-
ternational context when a foreign parent corpora-
tion controls a US subsidiary. US tax rules differ for 
US corporate members and foreign corporate mem-
bers of an MNE group. All the US members of an af-
filiated corporate group must file a consolidated US 
tax return. In the consolidated return, intragroup 
purchases and sales, and intragroup payments of 
dividends, interest, and royalties normally “net out,” 
with no tax consequences. In this context, the IRS 
Table 1. Interest paid by US entities to foreign persons, and withholding taxes collected 
by the IRS (2001) (in billions of dollars)  
FDI-related interest payments
Paid by US parent firms to  4.1
   their foreign affiliates 
Paid by US subsidiary firms to  24.8
   their foreign affiliates 
Other private interest payments
Bond interest payments 56.1
Bank interest payments 42.0
Interest paid by nonbank financial firms 38.0
US government interest payments 80.7
Total interest paid  245.7
Total interest payments reported for  126.6
US withholding tax purposes a
Total US withholding tax collected  4.2
on interest payments a
Effective withholding tax rates 
   On reported interest (percent) 3.4
   On total interest (percent) 1.7
Note: The term “persons” includes corporations, partnerships, governments, trusts, etc., as well as individuals.
a. Extrapolated from withholding tax returns for 1999. 
Sources: Survey of Current Business, April 2003, and IRS Statistics of Income, September 2002.Number PB03-7 May 2003 4
has less reason to be concerned about intragroup 
transfer prices or interest payments. Purchases by 
one group member from another, or interest pay-
ments from one to another, simply appear as offset-
ting items in the consolidated corporate tax return. 
However,  foreign  corporations  are  generally  not 
required (or permitted) to join in a consolidated re-
turn, whatever the extent of intragroup ownership. 
Hence,  the  IRS  is  very  concerned  about  transfer 
prices between US members and foreign members 
of the same MNE. The IRS is also concerned about 
interest payments from the US subsidiary to its for-
eign affiliates. Clearly these payments leave the US 
tax net, costing revenue in comparison with a hypo-
thetical financial structure where the US subsidiary 
was capitalized with equity rather than debt.
At  first  impression,  it  might  seem  reasonable 
for Congress to change the law to ensure that the 
IRS gets its one tax bite out of corporate interest 
payments that cross the US border. But the exist-
ing US tax structure is peppered with exceptions 
to  the  “one  tax  bite”  concept.  Table  1  provides  a 
useful overview.
In 2001, US entities paid approximately $246 
billion of interest to foreign persons (including cor-
porations, partnerships, trusts, governments, and 
individuals). Of this amount, some $81 billion was 
paid on US Treasury debt. By law, US Treasury in-
terest paid to foreign persons is free of US withhold-
ing tax. Interest paid to foreign persons by various 
private US entities totaled $165 billion. Nearly all 
bank interest paid to foreign persons is also free of 
withholding tax. Hence, only $123 billion was re-
ported to the IRS. On this amount, $4.2 billion was 
paid in US withholding tax. The effective US tax rate 
on reported interest was 3.4 percent. The effective 
US tax rate on total interest paid to foreigners was 
only half that level, 1.7 percent.
To summarize tax reality as opposed to tax the-
ory, about half of US interest payments to foreign 
persons is legally exempt from US withholding tax. 
The other half is taxed at the low effective rate of 3.4 
percent. Rather than describing the current US tax 
system for international interest payments as “one 
tax bite,” a more accurate description is “one tax 
taste.”8 There are strong policy reasons for a taste 
rather  than  a  bite.  Over  the  past  three  decades, 
treasury secretaries and Congresses alike have con-
cluded that the benefits to the US economy of open, 
almost tax-free access to international capital mar-
kets substantially outweigh whatever revenue might 
be collected on tax payments to foreign persons. The 
question, therefore, is not whether to defend the one 
tax bite principle; it has long since been abandoned. 
The question is whether the principle should be se-
lectively applied to interest paid by US subsidiaries 
to their foreign parents (or affiliates).
Treasury Report 
In  May  2002,  the  US  Treasury  issued  a  pre-
liminary report on corporate inversion transactions. 
The Treasury Report (2002) observes that corporate 
inversions occur largely because of the tax savings 
available and recommends a two-pronged approach 
to reduce the tax incentives.9
The first prong is aimed at tax motives associ-
ated with sheltering foreign-source income from US 
tax (i.e., avoiding the anti-deferral regime of Subpart 
F and excluding foreign-source income completely 
from the US corporate tax base). As for this motive, 
the Treasury acknowledges that the US worldwide 
tax system has its faults.
The  Treasury  Report  properly  recognizes  that 
corporate inversions stimulated by foreign-source-
income motives reflect a deep-seated problem: the 
competitive  tax  disadvantage  of  US-based  MNEs 
The Treasury Report recommends a 
two-pronged approach to reduce the tax 
incentives. The first prong is aimed at tax 
motives associated with sheltering foreign-
source income from US tax. The second 
prong is aimed at supposed tax loopholes 
that enable inverted corporations to shelter 
US-source income.
H.R. 5095 proposed by Chairman Bill 
Thomas in 2002 would significantly 
tighten the earnings stripping rules set 
forth in Section 163(j). It defines two 
types of corporate inversion transactions 
and establishes different adverse tax 
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in comparison with foreign-based MNEs.10 To ad-
dress this problem, the report calls for a compre-
hensive reexamination of the US international tax 
system as it applies to the foreign-source income of 
US corporations.11
  The  second  prong  is  aimed  at  supposed  tax 
loopholes that enable inverted corporations to shel-
ter US-source income. However, inversions are by no 
means the only way that US-source income can be 
sheltered from corporate tax. The Treasury Report 
recognizes that “it is important not to lose sight of 
the fact that in many cases the same types of tax 
reduction may be achieved through other means.”12
It goes on to argue that “because the opportuni-
ties for earnings stripping are not limited to inver-
sion transactions but are present in cases where a 
U.S. business is structured from the outset with a 
foreign parent and in cases where a foreign corpora-
tion acquires a U.S. operating group, reconsidera-
tion of these rules should not be limited in applica-
tion to inverted companies…”
Chairman Thomas
In June 2002, Bill Thomas (R-CA), chairman of 
the House Ways and Means Committee, with the 
support  of  the  Treasury,  introduced  H.R.  5095.13 
The  bill  was  centrally  motivated  by  the  foreign 
sales corporation (FSC) case.14 In addition, Thomas 
included measures specifically designed to thwart 
corporate inversions:15
• First and foremost, the bill would significantly 
tighten the earnings stripping rules set forth in 
Section 163(j). The rules are designed to limit 
the  deduction  when  interest  is  paid  by  a  US 
subsidiary to a related foreign corporation.
•  The  bill  imposes  additional  tax  burdens  on 
corporate  inversions.  It  defines  two  types  of 
corporate  inversion  transactions  and  estab-
lishes  different  adverse  tax  consequences  for 
each type.16
• For inversion transactions involving at least 80 
percent identity of stock ownership (i.e., when 
the former shareholders of the top-tier US cor-
poration hold 80 percent or more of the stock of 
the new foreign parent), H.R. 5095 would deem 
the foreign parent to be a US corporation.17 For 
tax purposes, this would effectively unwind the 
inversion transaction.
• For inversion transactions involving at least 
60  percent  but  less  then  80  percent  identity 
of  stock  ownership,  the  corporate  “toll  taxes” 
imposed under existing law for establishing the 
inverted structure could not in turn be offset by 
other tax attributes such as net operating losses 
or foreign tax credits.
• The bill also imposes a 20 percent excise tax 
on the value of all stock options and stock-based 
compensation held by insiders, top executives, 
and directors of a company that inverts.
In the eyes of the Treasury and Congressman 
Thomas, the cutting edge of H.R. 5095 is the tight-
ening of Section 163(j) to discourage earnings strip-
ping.  Written  testimony  of  Acting  Assistant  Trea-
sury Secretary Pamela Olson stated that revisions 
to the Section 163(j) rules are “needed immediately 
to eliminate what is referred to as the real “juice” in 
an inversion transaction.”18
Earnings Stripping Rules Under Section 163(j)
Language is important, and labels often deter-
mine public policy. The phrase “earnings stripping” 
conveys  a  malignant  tone.  Like  “tax  loophole”  or 
“tax  haven,”  it  connotes  something  that  ought  to 
be stopped. In this policy brief, we do not attempt a 
new and kinder label for the phenomenon, but we 
do argue that earnings stripping is not the malig-
nant force suggested by the Treasury Report or H.R. 
5095.  To  help  understand  the  proposed  amend-
ments  to  Section  163(j)  and  the  role  of  earnings 
stripping in the larger international economic pic-
ture, we first review the current rules on earnings 
stripping and then analyze the proposed changes.
Existing  Law.  Earnings  stripping  is  said  to 
occur when an excessive portion of the corporate 
earnings of a US subsidiary is paid out as inter-
est to the foreign parent corporation (or one of its 
foreign  subsidiaries)  and  claimed  as  a  deduction 
against the corporate income of the US subsidiary. 
Before the enactment of Section 163(j) in 1989, the 
excessive interest payments would be taxed by the 
United States only at the treaty-withholding rate, 
which might be zero. The IRS could challenge the 
extent  of  related-party  debt,  but  only  on  a  case-
by-case basis, as explained earlier. Section 163(j) 
changed  the  case-by-case  approach  for  US  sub-
sidiaries of foreign corporations. Interest paid to a 
related foreign corporation was labeled disqualified 
The Bush administration proposal, designed 
by the Treasury Department, generally 
follows the provisions of H.R. 5095, except 
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interest,19 and the deduction was denied if the US 
subsidiary’s debt-equity ratio exceeded 1.5 to 1 (the 
so-called “safe harbor” test) and if the subsidiary’s 
net  interest  expense  exceeded  50  percent  of  its 
“adjusted taxable income” (ATI).20 In other words, 
the US subsidiary had to flunk two tests before its 
related-party  interest  was  disallowed.  Disallowed 
interest  could  be  carried  forward  indefinitely  and 
claimed as a deduction when the subsidiary passed 
one or both tests.
H.R.  5095.  The  bill  proposed  by  Chairman 
Thomas  in  2002  would  strengthen  the  earnings 
stripping restrictions in the current Section 163(j) 
by making the following amendments: 
• Eliminate the current 1.5 to 1 debt-equity safe 
harbor altogether.
• Replace the 50 percent of ATI test with a 35 
percent test.
• Add an alternative test, the excess-domestic-
disqualified-interest test, based on the extent to 
which the US subsidiary’s ratio of debt to assets 
exceeds  the  ratio  for  the  worldwide  affiliated 
group.21
• Calculate disallowed interest for the taxable 
year as the amount of disqualified interest (as 
defined in existing law) that is the greater of: 
(1)  excess  interest  calculated  under  the  new 
excess-domestic-disqualified-interest test; or (2) 
excess interest calculated under the 35 percent 
of ATI test.
•  Tighten  the  carry-forward  provisions  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  taxpayer:  interest  disal-
lowed under the 35 percent of ATI test can be 
carried forward only to the extent it exceeds the 
interest disallowed under the excess-domestic-
disqualified-interest  test.  Interest  disallowed 
under the excess-domestic-disqualified-interest 
test, to the extent it exceeds the interest disal-
lowed under the ATI test, is permanently disal-
lowed—no  carry  forward  is  permitted.  Finally, 
any disallowed interest eligible to be carried for-
ward can only be carried forward for five years 
(not indefinitely, as under current law).
Treasury Budget Proposal. The Bush adminis-
tration proposal (made in February 2003 in its fis-
cal 2004 budget), designed by the Treasury Depart-
ment, generally follows the provisions of H.R. 5095, 
except that it adds a new “safe harbor” test. Under 
the Treasury’s safe harbor, the current 1.5 to 1 debt-
equity safe harbor would be replaced by a series of 
safe  harbors  determined  by  the  leverage  typically 
associated with the corporation’s line of business. 
So long as the US subsidiary’s debt was within the 
safe harbor, new Section 163(j) would not disallow 
related-party interest payments as a deductible ex-
pense. While revenue forecasts are hazardous, the 
Treasury projects that its proposal would increase 
US tax collections by a cumulative amount of $3.4 
billion over 11 years. H.R. 5095 would increase tax 
collections substantially more, because it does not 
contain the safe harbors. 
Table 2. FDI in the United States, associated employment, interest and dividends paid, 
and US withholding taxes (2001)
FDI stock at historical cost ($ billions) 1,321.1
FDI stock at market value ($ billions)  2,526.7
Average annual FDI inflows (1999–2001, $ billions)  236.2
Employment (nonbank employees, in thousands) a 5,562.5
Percent of US employment in nonbank private industry 5.6
Distributed earnings ($ billions) 20.4
  US withholding tax ($ billions) 1.1
Interest paid to foreign affiliates ($ billions) 24.8
  US withholding tax ($ billions) 0.1
Effective withholding tax rate (percent)  0.4%
a.  Employment is for 2000.
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Problems Created by Tighter Rules
The revisions proposed by H.R. 5095 and the 
Treasury  (even  with  its  flexible  safe  harbor)  raise 
serious policy issues, under four headings: invest-
ment  chill,  tax  equity,  compliance  burdens,  and 
international norms.
Investment  Chill.  If  the  earnings  stripping 
amendments are enacted, foreign-based MNEs may 
reduce  their  inbound  investments  in  the  United 
States because of higher effective taxation. As table 
2 shows, inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
been running about $250 billion annually. In 2001 
(as in other recent years), interest payments have 
been running around $25 billion, somewhat more 
than distributed earnings (i.e., dividends). The ef-
fective US withholding rate on interest payments is 
under 1 percent. However, to the extent interest is 
disallowed under H.R. 5095 or the Treasury pro-
posal, the effective US corporate tax rate would leap 
to around 35 percent at the federal level. The higher 
tax  rate  could  easily  put  a  chill  on  new  inbound 
FDI.23  In the short run, that would put downward 
pressure on the dollar in foreign exchange markets 
and upward pressure on US interest rates. In the 
long run, a reduction in inward FDI would deprive 
the US economy of the growth benefits of inward 
FDI (Graham and Krugman 1995).
Tax Equity. Foreign-based MNEs operating in 
the United States rightly argue that H.R. 5095 and 
the Treasury proposal discriminate against them as 
compared to US-based MNEs. Yet there is no factual 
justification  for  discrimination.  Research  studies 
conducted  by  Treasury  officials  and  independent 
scholars find little or no evidence that foreign-based 
MNEs erode the US corporate tax base through the 
use of related-party debt to a greater extent than 
other US corporate taxpayers.24
Consideration  of  the  credit  market  conditions 
facing  US-based  and  foreign-based  MNEs  quickly 
shows the de facto nature of discrimination under 
the proposed changes to Section 163(j). US-based 
MNEs can rely on their high credit standing to bor-
row worldwide directly or indirectly from unrelated 
parties—banks, pension funds, insurance compa-
nies, and individual bondholders. The debt can be 
structured so that interest is deductible in the Unit-
ed States, whether or not it is taxed abroad. To take 
a very common example, US MNEs can borrow from 
commercial banks or the commercial paper market, 
and the interest income can be paid to foreign per-
sons with little or no US tax. The IRS does not get a 
juicy tax bite from these payments; at most it gets a 
small tax taste. Moreover, US corporations are only 
subject to the “facts and circumstances” test to de-
termine whether their debt is excessive.
US subsidiaries of foreign-based MNEs, seen as 
stand-alone borrowers, usually lack the high credit 
standing that would allow them to borrow world-
wide directly or indirectly from unrelated parties.25   
The high credit standing is usually an attribute of 
the foreign parent, not the US subsidiary. The only 
way the US subsidiary can incur large amounts of 
debt at low interest rates is by borrowing from its 
foreign  parent—which  in  turn  borrows  from  the 
anonymous  worldwide  credit  market.  But  related 
party debt quickly runs afoul of amended Section 
163(j).26 Unlike US-based MNEs, their foreign-based 
counterparts would be denied recourse to a “facts 
and circumstances” defense. In extreme cases, the 
excess-domestic-disqualified-interest  test  might 
deny interest deductions for corporations with no 
net interest expense (i.e., finance subsidiaries that 
had interest income in excess of interest expense) 
would be denied because they have disproportion-
ate indebtedness and pay interest to related foreign 
corporations.
By discriminating against foreign-based MNEs, 
the new Section 163(j) would indirectly make US-
based  MNEs  more  tax-competitive.  But  it  would 
do so by raising the tax burden on foreign-based 
MNEs. Therein lies a recipe for inviting retaliatory 
tax legislation abroad.
Compliance  Burden.  Compliance  with  the 
proposed  excess-domestic-disqualified-interest 
test should be another source of concern. The pro-
posed  test  requires  a  worldwide  determination  of 
MNE assets and liabilities. This procedure invites 
copycat  reporting  requirements  abroad.  Copycat 
reporting  could  eventually  lead  to  a  requirement 
of consolidated worldwide financial accounts for all 
members of an affiliated group, wherever located. 
That would be a major change in the international 
tax  regime  constructed  over  the  past  century.  If 
consolidated worldwide accounts are a good idea, 
they  deserve  to  be  debated  on  their  merits,  not 
introduced piecemeal.
Congress should exclude the earnings 
stripping provisions from H.R. 5095 
altogether. It should leave intact the other 
measures advocated by Chairman Thomas—
stiff “toll taxes” and reforms to US taxation 
of foreign-source income—to discourage 
corporate inversions.Number PB03-7 May 2003 8
International  Norms.  The  earnings  stripping 
proposals  seriously  conflict  with  three  interna-
tional tax norms: the general proscription against 
double taxation, the widely accepted arm’s length 
standard, and the nondiscrimination clauses in US 
tax treaties.
Double taxation. The proposed amendments to 
Section 163(j) would substantially increase the po-
tential for double taxation. The reason is that the 
new  carry-forward  limitations  change  the  cast  of 
Section 163(j) from a mechanism to defer disallowed 
interest expenses, to a mechanism for permanent 
disallowance. By this device, interest expense could 
be disallowed in the United States but still taxed 
in a foreign jurisdiction. The US tax treaty network 
has  no  mechanism  for  correcting  the  resulting 
double taxation.
Arm’s length. The excess-domestic-disqualified-
interest test is inconsistent with the arm’s length 
standard, since it does not reflect whether an in-
dependent  third  party  lender  would  have  loaned 
the same amount to the US subsidiary under the 
same  terms  and  conditions.27  The  arm’s  length 
principle is widely accepted for dividing the income 
and expenses of an MNE group between taxing ju-
risdictions. It is embodied in tax treaties based on 
the OECD Model Tax Treaty (OECD Model), the UN 
Model Tax Convention, as well as in domestic laws 
of many countries, including Section 482 of the IRC. 
It is considered a key component for avoiding in-
ternational double taxation and thereby facilitating 
cross-border trade and investment.28
The  OECD  guidelines  define  the  arm’s  length 
principle  to  be  the  “international  standard  that 
OECD  member  countries  have  agreed  should  be 
used for determining transfer prices for tax purpos-
es.” The most authoritative statement of the princi-
ple is found in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD 
Model, which requires that associated enterprises 
deal with each other on an arm’s length basis, that 
is, on the same terms and conditions as would ap-
ply if the parties were not related.29
In  the  context  of  related-party  loans,  the  im-
plementation  of  the  arm’s  length  principle  is  ar-
ticulated in a 1987 OECD Research Paper (OECD 
1987), which applies Article 9 of the OECD Model 
Tax Treaty to situations in which a so-called debt 
instrument should be recharacterized as equity for 
tax purposes. The research paper suggests that the 
preferable  approach  to  these  “thin  capitalization” 
situations is a “facts and circumstances” approach, 
and not a “fixed ratio” test (i.e., the approach em-
bodied in Section 163(j)).30
The  United  States  has  traditionally  advocated 
the arm’s length standard. Repudiation of the arm’s 
length standard with respect to related-party inter-
est payments will invite erosion in other areas. This 
step  should  not  be  taken  without  deep  consider-
ation of its ramifications.31
Finally, the earnings stripping proposals conflict 
with nondiscrimination clauses included in many 
US  tax  treaties,  including  Article  24(3)  of  the  US 
Model Treaty (which is based on Article 24(4) of the 
OECD Model).32 These provisions generally commit 
the United States to give a deduction for interest 
paid by a US company to a treaty-partner resident 
to the same extent that such interest would be de-
ductible if paid to a US resident.
The legislative history of Section 163(j) suggests 
that Congress was aware of the potential conflict 
between Section 163(j) and US treaty obligations. 
However, the legislation history reflects two alter-
native explanations why Congress believed Section 
163(j) does not breach US treaty nondiscrimination 
requirements. The first explanation is based on a 
tortured  interpretation  of  the  phrase  “under  the 
same  conditions”  in  the  treaty  nondiscrimination 
clause.33  The  second  explanation  focuses  on  the 
argument that current Section 163(j), as applied, is 
congruent with the arm’s length standard for pur-
poses of making thin capitalization determinations 
and thus should not be deemed to violate the treaty 
nondiscrimination provisions.
The Treasury should issue nondiscriminatory 
regulations under Section 385, applicable 
to all US corporations, to define and 
appropriately limit the use of excessive debt 
that abusively erodes the US corporate 
tax base. 
Congress should direct the Treasury to 
undertake a comprehensive study to 
determine whether the current practice 
of taxing international interest payments 
at a low effective rate (under 2 percent) 
remains in the national interest.Number PB03-7 May 2003 9
Even if these explanations were valid when Sec-
tion 163(j) was first enacted (which we doubt),34 they 
would have little force if the proposed amendments 
were enacted. The new Section 163(j) would clearly 
discriminate  against  interest  payments  to  related 
foreign parties. 
Recommendations
Proposals to amend Section 163(j) are stimulat-
ed by the perceived problem of corporate inversion 
transactions  and  a  fear  that  inverting  companies 
are loading up with debt to their new foreign affili-
ates, thereby eroding the US corporate tax base.
However,  the  proposals  go  far  beyond  dealing 
with tax-motivated inversion transactions. They ap-
ply across the board to all foreign-based MNEs oper-
ating in the United States. They pose a substantial 
risk of collateral damage to the US economy and US 
international tax principles that far outweigh any 
benefits.
We believe that prudent tax policy should avoid 
these risks and instead be based on the three rec-
ommendations: 
• Congress should exclude the earnings strip-
ping  provisions  from  H.R.  5095  altogether.  It 
should  leave  intact  the  other  measures  advo-
cated  by  Chairman  Thomas—stiff  “toll  taxes” 
and  reforms  to  US  taxation  of  foreign-source 
income—to discourage corporate inversions. 
• The Treasury should issue nondiscriminatory 
regulations under Section 385, applicable to all 
US  corporations,  to  define  and  appropriately 
limit  the  use  of  excessive  debt  that  abusively 
erodes the US corporate tax base. 
•  Congress  should  direct  the  Treasury  to  un-
dertake  a  comprehensive  study  to  determine 
whether the current practice of taxing interna-
tional interest payments at a low effective rate 
(under 2 percent) remains in the national inter-
est. If so, the Treasury should say so. If not, the 
Treasury should submit a comprehensive pro-
posal that deals with all avenues for tax exemp-
tion of interest payments—zero withholding on 
Treasury debt, zero withholding on bank inter-
est, and zero withholding in tax treaties.Number PB03-7 May 2003 10
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Endnotes
1 A corporation is treated as domestic if it is incor-
porated under the laws of the United States or any 
state. Firms incorporated under the laws of foreign 
countries are treated as foreign. 
2 Through new debt securities and the transfer of 
intangible assets, the treaty jurisdiction subsidiary 
becomes a creditor of the US subsidiary and, in 
addition, holds the patents, trademarks and copy-
rights used by the corporate group. 
3 For example, it was reported that Tyco Corpo-
ration saved more than $400 million in 2001 by 
reason of an inversion transaction that occurred in 
1997.
4 This piece of tax planning is possible because the 
foreign corporation (in the treaty jurisdiction) that 
receives the interest income is not a US-controlled 
foreign corporation. While the interest or royalty 
income is passive income, it is not subject to the 
anti-deferral rules of Subpart F of the IRC, because 
those rules only apply to a US-controlled foreign 
corporation. 
5 The United States taxes foreign corporations 
only on income that has a connection (nexus) to 
the United States—for example, income that is 
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade 
or business. The newly minted corporation in the 
treaty jurisdiction does not conduct trade or busi-
ness in the United States; it only receives interest, 
dividends, and royalties from its US subsidiary.
6 The purpose of Subpart F rules (Section 951 of 
the IRC) is to protect the integrity of the world-
wide US tax system. Under the deferral principle, 
the income of a foreign subsidiary of a US parent 
corporation is generally not subject to US taxation 
until the income is distributed to the US parent. 
However, under the rules of Subpart F, a US par-
ent is subject to immediate taxation on the passive 
income earned by its foreign subsidiaries located 
in tax haven countries. Thus, only active business 
income of foreign subsidiaries is generally subject 
to deferral. 
7 In 2003, President Bush proposed the total elimi-
nation of taxes on dividends received by resident 
US shareholders. If enacted, the Bush proposal 
would mean that dividends, like interest, are only 
taxed once. As of early May 2003, it appears that 
Congress may agree to tax dividends at a lower 
rate (15 percent) but not eliminate the tax entirely.
8 Even interest paid to US persons is more often 
subject to a tax taste than a tax bite, as illustrated 
by 1999 data. The national income accounts in-
dicate that individuals received $1,001 billion of 
interest income. Tax-exempt interest paid by states 
and municipalities to individuals, and reported on 
their returns, amounted to $52 billion. Taxable in-
terest reported on individual tax returns was $176 
billion. The obvious conclusion is that there is 
severe underreporting of taxable interest income on 
individual tax returns. Moreover, many individuals 
received interest payments via accumulated earn-
ings in their pension funds, on which tax was de-
ferred for many years. Tax deferred is tax partially 
forgiven, and total pension payments to individuals 
in 1999 amounted to $304 billion. (All figures are 
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States 
2002.) 
9 In addition to these two prongs, the Treasury 
Report (2002) calls for a review of tax treaties to 
curtail treaty shopping abuses, another look at the 
toll taxes when assets (especially intangible assets) 
are transferred to a foreign corporation, and a new 
reporting requirement for inversion transactions. 
10 According to the Treasury Report (2002), “[t]he 
U.S. international tax rules can operate to impose 
a burden on U.S. based companies with foreign 
operations that is disproportionate to the tax 
burden imposed by our trading partners on the 
foreign operations of their companies. . . . Both the 
recent inversion activity and the increase in foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. MNCs are evidence that the 
competitive disadvantage caused by our interna-
tional tax rules is a serious issue with significant 
consequences for U.S. businesses and the U.S. 
economy.”
11 The Treasury Report (2002) calls for reevalua-
tion of the anti-deferral regime of Subpart F and of 
the foreign tax credit rules, and an examination of 
the merits of an exemption-based (territorial) tax 
system. Similar reforms were urged by Gary Clyde 
Hufbauer and Joanna M. van Rooij (1992).
12 The Treasury Report (2002) refers to two specific 
transactions: the first is a start-up company pre-
dominantly owned by US persons but established 
as a subsidiary of a foreign corporation located in a 
tax haven; the second is a cross-border acquisition 
that results in all US operations being owned by a 
foreign corporation. 
13 American Competitiveness Act of 2002 (H.R. 
5095, sometimes referred to as the Treasury pro-
posal).
14 See Hufbauer (2002). To compensate the busi-
ness sector for the elimination of FSC benefits, 
Thomas proposed several international tax reforms 
that would reduce the corporate tax burden and 
narrow the competitive tax disadvantage faced by 
US-based MNEs.
15 In addition to the enumerated measures, H.R. 
5095 also calls for a Treasury study of treaty shop-Number PB03-7 May 2003 12
ping and other anti-abuse rules and it creates new 
reporting requirements.
16 The adverse consequences apply only if the in-
verted corporation does not have substantial busi-
ness activities in the foreign country in which it 
is organized when compared to the total business 
activities of the affiliated group. Certain partner-
ship transactions are also covered in H.R. 5095.
17 This part of the proposal would not apply to 
inversion transactions completed after March 20, 
2005, and it is designed to give Congress and the 
Treasury time to “carefully and thoughtfully ex-
amine the effects of the bill on corporate behavior” 
(press release, Chairman Thomas, August 2, 2002). 
18 Olson’s testimony was submitted to the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means on June 6, 2002.
19 Disqualified Interest also includes interest paid 
to unrelated parties in circumstances where the 
related party guarantees the debt. 
20 ATI is taxable income computed without regard 
to deductions for net interest expense, net operat-
ing losses, and depreciation, amortization, and 
depletion. Under Section 163(j), so-called “excess 
limitations” (i.e., any excess of the 50 percent limit 
over a company’s net interest expense for a given 
year) can be carried forward three years.
21 Under the new test, total assets of the US sub-
sidiary are first divided by total assets of the world-
wide group. That calculation yields a fraction. Debt 
of the US subsidiary is then defined as “dispropor-
tionate” to the extent that it exceeds the product 
of this fraction and the total external debt of the 
worldwide group.
22 Under the Treasury budget proposal there are 
seven classes of assets with ratios ranging from 
0.98 for cash and equivalents class to 0.5 for the 
intangibles class. The aggregate of the products of 
the value of the assets within each class times the 
applicable ratio for that class yields a number. If 
the total debt of the foreign-owned US corporation 
does not exceed this number (i.e., the safe harbor 
figure), section 163(j) would not apply. Although 
not specified in the Treasury’s budget proposal, the 
Treasury has unofficially clarified that “value” of 
each class of asset for this purpose means its US 
tax basis.
23 In this regard, the European Commission (2002) 
commented: “H.R. 5095 ... as currently drafted will 
affect the legitimate foreign subsidiaries in the US 
... with the results that the earnings stripping rules 
would be even more onerous than current law. 
Such legislation, if passed into law, could negative-
ly impact FDI into the US.” 
24 Two research studies conducted by Treasury of-
ficials during the 1990s, using corporate tax files, 
found no clear evidence that foreign-controlled 
US corporations lower their US taxable income 
through the use of related-party debt more than 
US-controlled US corporations. See Grubert, Good-
speed, and Swenson (1993) and Grubert (1997). 
Independent research conducted in 2001 suggest-
ed that there is no evidence that taxable income 
declines more after a non-US shareholder acquires 
a US domiciled firm than after a US shareholder 
acquires a US-domiciled firm. See Blouin, Collins, 
and Shackelford 2001.
25 The Treasury Report (2002) argues that “a cor-
porate structure that involves a foreign parent 
corporation and US operating subsidiaries provides 
particular opportunities for reducing the US tax 
on the income earned from US operations. These 
opportunities are not available in the same way to 
corporate groups with a US parent corporation.” 
In a literal sense the argument may be correct, but 
US operating subsidiaries of foreign-based MNEs 
have far more limited access to the credit markets 
than US operating subsidiaries of US-based MNEs. 
US operating subsidiaries of US-based MNEs can 
borrow worldwide, guaranteed by the parent firms, 
without running afoul of Section 163(j). This is not 
true of US operating subsidiaries of foreign-based 
MNEs. 
26 The current Section 163(j) already discriminates 
against foreign-based MNEs, but the amended Sec-
tion 163(j) would make the discrimination consid-
erably more severe.
27 The excess-domestic-disqualified-interest test 
operates by mechanically calculating whether a US 
corporation is disproportionately leveraged relative 
to the corporate group as a whole. Among other 
problems, this approach unjustifiably assumes 
that the MNC group operates uniformly in terms of 
credit-market conditions worldwide. 
28 The application of this principle is guided by the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for MNC Enter-
prises and Tax Administrations (OECD guidelines).
29 Article 9 provides, “[when] conditions are made 
or imposed between ... two [associated] enterprises 
in their commercial or financial relations which dif-
fer from those which would be made between inde-
pendent enterprises, then any profits which would, 
but for those conditions, have accrued to one of 
the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, 
have not so accrued, may be included in the profits 
of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.”
30 The legislative history of the current earnings 
stripping rules suggests that Congress viewed 
the 1.5 to 1 debt-to-equity safe harbor as broadly 
consistent with the capital structure of indepen-
dent companies. Congress apparently believed 
that the safe-harbor would excuse many US cor-
porations with typical capital structures from any of the earnings stripping rules. In contrast, the 
proposed excess-domestic-disqualified-interest test 
clearly abandons any pretense at the arm’s length 
standard in favor of a rigid formula that would 
disallow interest expense incurred in truly arm’s 
length transactions. The Treasury proposal, to be 
sure, adds the flexible safe harbor discussed in the 
text. Conceivably the “right” safe harbor would be 
consistent with the arm’s length standard, but the 
Treasury’s tests seem wide off the mark. The Trea-
sury has unofficially indicated that its safe-harbor 
tests would be based on the tax basis of the assets 
of the US corporate borrower rather than their fair 
market values. However, bankers who consider 
lending funds to an unrelated borrower generally 
evaluate their security in terms of fair market val-
ues and not the tax basis of assets. That is espe-
cially relevant to technology corporations where 
asset values largely consist of patents, trademarks, 
and copyrights. These are usually generated by the 
company itself and have a very low tax basis. 
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31 The conceptual alternative to the arm’s length 
standard is formula apportionment. Formula ap-
portionment would dramatically change the taxa-
tion of all MNEs. If it is a good idea, it deserves to 
be debated as a concept, not introduced through 
the back door. 
32 Article 24(4) of the US Model Treaty provides in 
pertinent part that “interest ... paid by a resident 
of a Contracting State to a resident of the other 
Contracting State shall, for the purposes of deter-
mining the taxable profits of the first-mentioned 
resident, be deductible under the same conditions 
as if [the interest] had been paid to a resident of 
the first-mentioned State.”
33 The thrust of the explanation is that, in applying 
the nondiscrimination clauses of US tax treaties to 
Section 163(j), a comparison should be made be-
tween interest paid to a taxable US person, and not 
to a foreign lender based in a tax haven country. 
34 See Culbertson (2003).